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Abstract 
A revised Stroop color-naming task was used to test hypotheses derived from Beck’s cognitive the-
ory of anxiety disorders which proposes that social phobics are hypervigilant to social-evaluative 
threat cues. Color-naming latencies for social and physical threat words were compared to matched 
neutral words for both social phobics and individuals with panic disorder. As predicted, social pho-
bics showed longer latencies for social threat words, and panickers had longer latencies for physical 
threat words. Latency for color-naming social threat words correlated with self-reported avoidance 
among social phobics. These results are consistent with Beck’s notion of self-schemata which facili-
tate the processing of threat cues. Methodological issues and clinical implications are discussed. 
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Beck has described anxiety disorders as “hypersensitive alarm systems . . . sensitive to any 
stimuli that might be taken as indicating imminent disaster or harm” (Beck & Emery, 1985, 
p. 31). This hypersensitivity is characterized by a style of cognitive processing, known as 
the vulnerability mode, which facilitates the processing of danger or threat cues. The vulner-
ability mode is an organization of cognitive structures called schemata, formulae, or rules 
based on experience which “orient the individual to a situation and help him [or her] to 
select relevant details from the environment and to recall relevant data” (p. 54). According 
to Beck, the schemata of anxiety-disordered individuals are dysfunctional in that they are 
hypersensitive to threat cues and hyposensitive to safety cues. 
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For social phobics, the vulnerability mode becomes active in social situations. Their 
schemata define them as defective or lacking the resources to meet social demands. Social 
situations are construed as challenges or confrontations in which they are at risk for re-
vealing signs of vulnerability or weakness. Schematic hypersensitivity to threat cues may 
protect the vulnerable self from the perceived landmines of social interaction. However, 
social phobics’ self-schemata overestimate their vulnerability and confirm their expecta-
tions of negative evaluation. 
Thus Beck hypothesizes that vulnerability to negative evaluation is the primary con-
struct in social phobics’ cognitive representation of themselves in social situations. As a 
result of these self-schemata, social phobics process social information differently from 
nonphobics. Unfortunately, little research exists on social phobics’ information-processing 
styles. A number of studies do, however, offer indirect support for Beck’s proposals. 
Several researchers have reported that high social anxiety is associated with a prepon-
derance of negative self-statements (Cacioppo, Merluzzi, & Glass, 1979; Dodge, Hope, Heim-
berg, & Becker, 1988; Glass, Merluzzi, Biever, & Larsen, 1982). These negative self-statements 
generally fall into four categories: (1) thoughts of general social inadequacy, (2) concerns 
with others’ awareness of distress, (3) fear of negative evaluation, and (4) preoccupation 
with arousal or performance (Hartman, 1984). These data are consistent with Beck’s hy-
pothesized vulnerability mode. Socially anxious persons’ verbal reports suggest that they 
do construe themselves as probable victims of negative evaluation and as unable to meet 
the demands of social situations. However, self-statement assessment does not directly test 
Beck’s notion of anxiety schemata because it examines the verbal content of cognitive ac-
tivity rather than information-processing styles. 
The primary function of schemata is to guide the processing of information. Social pho-
bics’ self-schemata should facilitate processing aspects of social situations that are schema-
consistent. A number of studies suggest that socially anxious individuals do process infor-
mation in a manner that confirms their view of themselves in social situations. Socially 
anxious individuals underrate their performance in social interactions, although they are 
able to make accurate ratings of others’ performance (Clark & Arkowitz, 1975). They recall 
an excess of negative feedback (O’Banion & Arkowitz, 1977) and view feedback as more 
negative than nonanxious individuals (Smith & Sarason, 1975). 
Schemata may also disrupt the processing of discrepant or irrelevant information. Some 
aspects of social interactions not essential for evaluating vulnerability, such as information 
about the interaction partner, may be screened out by socially anxious individuals. Socially 
anxious subjects do not show a preference for similar over dissimilar interaction partners 
(Heimberg, Acerra, & Holstein, 1985), a phenomenon that has been repeatedly demonstrated 
in nonanxious subjects (Byrne, 1971). They also recall fewer of their partner’s self-disclosures 
than nonanxious subjects following a heterosocial interaction (Hope, Heimberg, & Klein, 
1990). Although information about the interaction partner may not be essential to evaluat-
ing one’s own social performance, this processing strategy may put socially anxious indi-
viduals at a disadvantage during social interactions and increase the probability that their 
fears of negative evaluation may become a reality (Heimberg, Acerra, & Holstein, 1985; 
Hope et al., 1990). 
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Three studies provide more direct evaluation of the social information-processing strat-
egies of socially anxious college students. Goldfried and colleagues (Goldfried, Padawer, 
& Robins, 1984) asked socially anxious and nonanxious men to sort social situations into 
categories. Anxious men utilized the dimension “chance of being evaluated” but nonanx-
ious men sorted situations on the dimensions of “intimacy” and “academic relevance.” In 
a follow-up study (Robins, 1987), socially anxious subjects rated social situations as more 
risky and uncomfortable than nonanxious subjects. However, they utilized the dimension 
of intimacy more than nonanxious subjects in sorting situations. Robins suggested that this 
difference from the earlier study was a reflection of differences in stimulus materials but 
also noted that differences across situations in intimacy may be very important to socially 
anxious persons since they may determine the behaviors a person may expect to (or be 
expected to) perform. 
The third study to directly examine information-processing used a depth of processing 
paradigm. Socially anxious and nonanxious subjects rated lists of adjectives on whether or 
not another person would use the adjective to describe them (Smith, Ingrain, & Brehm, 
1983). Anxious subjects recalled more of these descriptive adjectives than nonanxious sub-
jects, but only when anticipating a heterosocial interaction. Superior recall was hypothe-
sized to indicate increased processing of the words which presumably occurred because 
how one appears to others was schema-relevant for socially anxious subjects awaiting a 
social interaction. However, greater recall (increased processing) did not occur when sub-
jects were asked to determine whether they would use the words to describe themselves, 
a nonsocial task and therefore unrelated to schemata which evaluate social threat. 
No studies have yet investigated whether clinically severe social anxiety (social phobia) 
is associated with extensive processing of social threat cues. However, Mathews and Mac-
Leod (1985, 1986; MacLeod, Mathews, & Tata, 1986) have used experimental cognitive 
methods to demonstrate that subjects with generalized anxiety disorder (GAD) show more 
extensive processing of threat-related cues than control subjects. Their first study utilized 
the Stroop (1938) color-naming task. In the original Stroop task, subjects named the ink 
colors in which either color names or groups of neutral stimuli were written. Stroop 
demonstrated that subjects’ response time was much longer for color names than for neu-
tral stimuli. Although the exact mechanism of the effect is unclear (Dyer, 1973), it appears 
that increased response latencies are attributable to semantic processing of color-named 
words, despite instructions to the contrary. In Mathews and MacLeod’s version of the task, 
GAD subjects and normal controls named the ink colors of words related to physical (e.g., 
disease, fatal) or social (e.g., foolish, criticized) threat or of neutral control words. Normal 
control subjects produced almost identical response times for threat and neutral words, 
but GAD subjects were slower on the threat words. The GAD subjects were then divided 
into two subgroups on the basis of whether they reported primarily physical worries or 
social worries. All subjects’ performance was disrupted by the social threat words, but only 
those reporting primarily physical worries were disrupted by the physical threat words. It 
is unlikely that these findings are attributable to the specific methodology employed be-
cause Mathews and MacLeod have essentially replicated these findings with a dichotic 
listening task (MacLeod et al., 1986) and a signal detection task (Mathews & MacLeod, 1986). 
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Foa and McNally (1986) examined obsessive-compulsives’ schemata using a dichotic 
listening procedure in which subjects repeated (shadowed) a prose passage they heard in 
their right ear while another passage containing a neutral target word or an individually 
selected fear word (e.g., urine, feces) was presented to their left ear. Prior to treatment, 
obsessive-compulsives were more likely to detect the fear word than the neutral word. 
However, following treatment, detection of the two types of words did not differ. Watts 
and colleagues (Watts, McKenna, Sharrock, & Trezise, 1986) found similar effects with the 
Stroop task in spider phobics. Spider phobics’ latency to name the ink colors in which spider-
related words were written was reduced following desensitization. Both studies suggest 
that the anxiety-disordered individuals were less hypervigilant to specific threat cues fol-
lowing treatment, thus indicating that the effect is not simply due to greater familiarity 
with the words. 
The studies described above examined the cognitive processes of individuals with gen-
eralized anxiety disorder, obsessive-compulsive disorder, and simple phobia of spiders. 
As noted above, no one has examined whether severely anxious social phobics are hyper-
vigilant to social threat cues in a similar manner. Therefore, we conducted a preliminary 
evaluation of the cognitive processing of social phobics using a revised version of the 
Stroop task. If social phobics are characterized by self-schemata which facilitate the pro-
cessing of social threat cues, they may demonstrate increased color-naming latencies for 
social threat words compared to neutral words. Secondly, we hypothesized that their sche-
mata would be specific to social threat and that they would not demonstrate increased 
latencies for other types of threat words. Finally, social phobic schemata should not be 
present in individuals with another anxiety disorder and, therefore, we predicted that in-
dividuals with panic disorder would not have increased latencies for social threat words. 
 
Method 
 
Subjects 
Subjects were 16 social phobics and 15 individuals with panic disorder without agorapho-
bia or with mild agoraphobic avoidance who sought treatment for anxiety at the Center 
for Stress and Anxiety Disorders, University at Albany, State University of New York. Sub-
jects were interviewed according to the Anxiety Disorders Interview Schedule–Revised 
(ADIS-R; DiNardo & Barlow, 1988; see DiNardo, O’Brien, Barlow, Waddell, & Blanchard, 
1983) which has recently been updated in accordance with revisions in the Diagnostic and 
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-III-R; American Psychiatric Association, 1987). 
Diagnostic interviews were conducted by clinical psychologists or advanced doctoral stu-
dents. In addition to determining diagnosis, the ADIS-R interviewer also rated each subject 
on the 0 to 8 Phobic Severity Rating Scale (PSR; Watson & Marks, 1971). Only subjects 
exhibiting moderate to severe impairment in daily functioning (PSR of 4 or greater) partic-
ipated in the study. Social phobics (M = 5.56, SD = 0.81) and panickers (M = 5.80, SD = 0.63, 
t(24) < 1) did not differ on the PSR. 
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Procedure 
Prior to beginning treatment, subjects completed a revised version of the Stroop color-
naming task (Stroop, 1938). As described earlier, the Stroop task involves naming the ink 
colors in which words are written. For the present study, the procedure was adapted from 
the one employed by Mathews and MacLeod (1985). Subjects named the ink colors of 
words or letter groups printed on six cards. We designed two forms (A, B) of the task be-
cause we originally intended to administer the task a second time following treatment and 
wished to control for practice effects. The words and colors utilized appear in Table I. The 
social threat words were selected to be representative of the self-schemata of social phobics 
in social situations. Words were chosen which evoked self-descriptive constructs (e.g., in-
adequate, inferior) or which described social phobics’ expectations for their performance 
in social interactions (e.g., criticized, failure). The physical threat words were selected in a 
similar manner to reflect the self-schemata of individuals with panic disorder as hypothe-
sized by Beck and Emery (1985). The social and physical threat control words were matched 
with their respective threat words on number of letters, number of syllables, and frequency 
of occurrence in the language (Caroll, Davies, & Richman, 1971). Subjects also named the 
ink colors of color names and groups of five Xs. Presentation order of the six cards and the 
form to be administered were randomly determined. Before each card, subjects gave rat-
ings of anger, anxiety, and happiness on 0 to 8 Likert-type scales. Although the anxiety 
rating was of primary interest, the anger and happiness ratings were included to defuse 
the possible schema-priming effect of self-rating anxiety. 
 
Table I. Stimuli for Forms A and B of the Revised Stroop Color-Naming Task 
Color names Social threat Social threat control Physical threat Physical threat control 
Form A 
pinka embarrassed specialized ambulance firelight 
green stupid insert fatal rayon 
black failure network illness leaning 
orange inferior obsidian doctor upward 
blue boring metric insane defied 
Ink colors used: pink, green, black, orange, blue 
Form B 
yellowa foolish portion hospital reported 
brown criticized narratives disease lighted 
gray shameful softened stroke sports 
red inadequate imperative coffin purely 
purple ridiculous democratic deadly parent 
Ink colors used: yellow, brown, gray, red, purple 
a. The control card for the color names consisted of groups of 5 Xs (XXXXX). 
 
Materials 
Each card consisted of words or letter groups hand-stenciled on 22 in. (56 cm) by 28 in. (71 
cm) white poster board. Block letters ½ in. (1.3 cm) high were written with marking pens 
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(Pentel Color Pens, Fine Point no. S360). The five words appeared randomly on 20 lines. 
Randomization was done within pairs of lines so that each word appeared twice in two 
lines. Each word could appear (a) once on each line, or (b) twice on one line (although not 
sequentially), but not on the other line of the pair. Ink color was randomly assigned to the 
words in the same manner. 
 
Administration of the Stroop Task 
One of two experimenters (DAH or MJD) administered the task using written instructions. 
The experimenter told the subjects that the task was a measure of how people see events 
in their environment. They were instructed to name aloud the ink colors in which words 
were written as quickly and accurately as possible. The experimenter showed subjects a 
sample card with four neutral words and one color name written in various colors to clarify 
the procedure. The anger, anxiety, and happiness rating scales were explained, and the 
experimenter showed subjects a card with five groups of three Zs written in pink, green, 
black, orange, and blue (Form A) or yellow, brown, gray, red, and purple (Form B). Sub-
jects named the ink colors of the Zs and were informed that these were the only colors they 
would see on subsequent cards. Finally, subjects were given the opportunity to practice 
the task. Subjects named the ink colors of five neutral words (once, interval, often, heavy, 
and desk) on a practice card. The practice card was identical to the other cards with the 
exception that each word was repeated 10 times rather than 20. Color-naming was timed 
for the practice card as described below. Once questions were answered, subjects rated 
their anger, anxiety, and happiness and the first card was presented. The experimenter 
began timing when the first color name was announced and stopped at the last color name. 
This procedure was repeated for each of the five remaining cards. 
 
Other Measures 
Both social phobics and panickers completed the verbal portion of the Shipley-Institute of 
Living Scale (Shipley, 1939). The Shipley Scale is a multiple-choice vocabulary test and was 
used as an estimate of verbal ability. 
Social phobics also developed a fear and avoidance hierarchy. The hierarchies consisted 
of 10 situations which were relevant to the concerns for which subjects sought treatment, 
and were individually constructed with the aid of the first author. Subjects rank-ordered 
the 10 situations on the basis of difficulty and then rated each situation on three 0 to 100 
scales—fear provoked by being in the situation, avoidance of the situation, and how con-
cerned the subjects were about negative evaluation in the situation. Higher numbers indi-
cate greater fear, more extensive avoidance, and more concern about evaluation. For the 
purposes of this study, only the five highest ranked situations were used. 
 
Results 
 
Preliminary Analyses 
Although the panickers’ scores on the vocabulary portion of the Shipley Scale were some-
what more variable (M = 31.57, SD = 5.26) than those achieved by social phobics (M = 32.94, 
SD = 2.62), the two groups did not differ (t(28) = 1.31, NS).1 Mean anxiety ratings also did 
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not distinguish the two groups (social phobics M = 2.56, SD = 1.97; panickers M = 2.64, 
SD = 1.48; t(29) < 1). 
 
Analyses of Color-Naming Latencies 
Matched-pairs t-tests were used to test the three a priori hypotheses outlined above: (1) social 
phobics would show greater color-naming latencies for social threat words compared to 
control words; (2) panickers would show greater color-naming latencies for physical threat 
words compared to control words: (3) social phobics would not demonstrate increased 
latencies for physical threat words and panickers would not demonstrate increased laten-
cies for social threat words. As shown in Table II, social phobics took longer to name the 
ink colors of social threat words (M = 88.02, SD = 17.17) than of matched control words 
(M = 80.30, SD = 15.72; t(15) = 3.80, p < 0.002). Color-naming latencies for panickers did not 
distinguish between social threat (M = 88.21, SD = 14.78) and control words (M = 84.02, 
SD = 14.64; t(14) = 1.44, NS). However, the opposite effect was found for the physical threat 
words. Panickers, but not social phobics, demonstrated increased latencies for the physical 
threat words (social phobics M = 87.98, SD = 15.12; panickers M = 92.14, SD = 18.49) com-
pared to the matched control words (social phobics M = 88.93, SD = 21.02, t(15) < 1; panick-
ers M = 84.42, SD = 12.68, t(14) = 3.01, p < 0.009). As expected, both groups had substantially 
longer latencies for color names than for Xs (social phobics t(15) = 6.98, p < 0.001; panickers 
t(14) = 9.69, p < 0.001). 
 
Table II. Color-Naming Latencies for Social Phobics and Panickersa 
Card type 
Target words 
(sec) 
 Control words 
(sec) 
t M SD  M SD 
Social threat words       
     Social phobics 88.02 17.17  80.30 15.72 3.80* 
     Panickers 88.21 14.78  84.02 14.64 1.44 
Physical threat words       
     Social phobics 87.98 15.12  88.93 21.02 < 1 
     Panickers 92.14 18.49  84.42 12.68 3.01* 
Stroop (color names)       
     Social phobics 127.77 35.33  73.77 16.82 6.98** 
     Panickers 123.20 26.59  71.61 11.75 9.69** 
a. N = 16 for social phobics; N = 15 for panickers. 
*p < 0.01 
**p < 0.001 
 
The difference between the color-naming latencies for social threat and control words 
was used as an index of social threat interference for the social phobics (a larger number 
indicates greater interference on the social threat words). This index was correlated with 
the mean fear (M = 78.31, SD = 12.15), avoidance (M = 70.78, SD = 15.87), and evaluation 
(M = 80.70, SD = 12.98) ratings from the fear and avoidance hierarchy. The correlation be-
tween the interference index (M = 7.72, SD = 8.13) and avoidance was significant, (r = 0.42, 
p < .05). 
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Discussion 
 
Our hypothesis that social phobics would show greater processing of words related to their 
self-schemata but not of unrelated words was supported. Furthermore, as we expected, 
panickers did not show increased processing of social threat words but did have longer 
latencies for words related to their specific concerns. These data support Beck and Emery’s 
(1985) hypothesis that social phobic and panickers have specific schemata which facilitate 
the processing of cues related to their sphere of vulnerability—social-evaluative concerns 
for social phobics and physical danger for panickers. Although these data are quite prom-
ising, we must note that the study is preliminary and requires replication. 
In selecting the social threat words we specifically chose words which, based on self-
statement assessment and our clinical experience, represented constructs in social phobics’ 
self-schemata. As noted above, social phobics not only fear being inadequate in social in-
teractions but also believe they actually do perform poorly, although objective observers 
may disagree (Clark & Arkowitz, 1975; Hope & Heimberg, 1988). Thus social phobics dis-
tort the events of social interactions to conform to their views of their own inadequacy. 
This study suggests how this distortion may occur. Social phobics devoted excessive amounts 
of processing capacity to information consistent with their self-schemata despite instruc-
tions to the contrary. Using such a strategy in social interactions would highlight any cues 
which fit their self-schemata, even if those cues were not characteristic of the overall tone 
of the interaction. For example, one or two speech dysfluencies would be much more sali-
ent than five minutes of fluent speech because the dysfluencies are consistent with the so-
cial phobics’ self-schemata and thus are more extensively processed and remembered. 
Thus the social phobic reports that the dysfluencies are characteristic of his or her verbal 
behavior while the interaction partner likely sees fluency as more characteristic. The final 
result is that the social phobic’s self-concept as a poor social interactor is confirmed, in spite 
of evidence to the contrary. 
The correlation between self-reported avoidance and the social threat interference index 
indicates that, even within a group characterized by avoidance of their feared situations, 
greater hypersensitivity to social-evaluative cues was associated with more avoidance. The 
social threat interference index estimates the extensiveness of the processing of the social 
threat cues. In Beck’s terminology, the index may be a measure of how vulnerable individ-
uals perceive themselves to be in social situations. While it is logical that greater perceived 
vulnerability is associated with more avoidance, little is known about the relationship be-
tween cognitive processing styles and behavior. The influence of self-schemata on avoid-
ance behavior merits further study. 
This study is one of the first direct tests of the schemata of social phobics, and our find-
ings indicate that the Stroop task is a viable strategy for examining cognitive structures in 
social phobia. However, these data are preliminary, and a number of methodological is-
sues need to be addressed in future research utilizing the Stroop. First, our study was de-
signed only to examine the amount of semantic interference generated by the social and 
physical threat words compared to their respective control words. Since word length and 
familiarity are thought to impact color-naming latencies, we carefully matched the threat 
and control words in order to measure only the interference caused by the meaning of the 
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threat words rather than by some extraneous factor. The implication is that the raw laten-
cies for the threat words cannot be compared directly. Ideally, the social and physical 
threat words would be matched on word length and frequency of occurrence. However, 
attempting to do so dramatically reduces the pool of available stimulus words and elimi-
nates words central to the construct of interest. Similarly, comparisons cannot be made 
across threat categories (e.g., comparing social threat words to physical threat control 
words or comparing physical threat words to social threat control words) because the two 
sets of control words are not equivalent. More research is needed to determine whether it 
is feasible to construct a single set of neutral control words for numerous sets of target words. 
The second methodological issue involves whether or not schemata have to be activated 
before they influence processing. As discussed earlier, Smith et al.’s (1983) manipulation 
produced superior recall only when socially anxious subjects were anticipating an interac-
tion. When not anticipating an interaction, their information-processing style did not dis-
tinguish them from nonanxious subjects. In the present study, schemata were likely 
activated since the Stroop task was completed in the setting in which the individuals had 
sought treatment for social anxiety and during the same appointment as other pretreat-
ment assessment procedures. We would expect smaller differences between the social 
threat and control word latencies if the schemata were not activated. 
Finally, although fear of negative evaluation is a common theme among social phobics, 
they are a heterogeneous group (e.g., Heimberg, Hope, Dodge, & Becket, 1990). Therefore, 
our use of standardized stimuli may have limited the effect size, and individualized stim-
uli would yield even longer latencies on the Stroop task. During cognitive restructuring 
that occurs as part of our cognitive-behavioral group treatment for social phobia (Heim-
berg, Becker, Goldfinger, & Vermilyea, 1985; Heimberg, Dodge, Hope, Kennedy, Zollo, & 
Becker, 1990), clients often use idiosyncratic language in describing their social fears. They 
may focus on a physical symptom such as shaking or blushing but usually at the heart of 
their fears is a derogatory self-statement such as “He/she will think I’m a wimp” (or “space-
cadet” or “jerk” to use examples from recent groups). In the present study we summarized 
such labels under “inferior” and “inadequate.” However, subjects’ own words for such 
concepts may be even more central to their self-schemata and, consequently, cause even 
greater interference on the Stroop task. 
With further development, the Stroop task may have utility for clinicians as well as re-
searchers. First, it could become an additional diagnostic tool. If word lists that are repre-
sentative of the cognitive constructs central to various disorders can be developed, the 
pattern of clients’ interference on the various lists would suggest which diagnostic label 
was most appropriate. In fact, tasks such as the Stroop may be particularly useful for cases 
which appear to fall between two diagnostic categories. For example, it is often difficult to 
discriminate between panic disorder and social phobia if the person has panic attacks in 
social situations and fears both the symptoms and the embarrassment of visible signs of 
anxiety. In such a case an assessment of the person’s information-processing strategies may 
reveal whether fear of the symptoms or of embarrassment is more central. 
Secondly, the Stroop task could potentially help clinicians determine which issues should 
be the focus of cognitive restructuring exercises. As noted above, individuals within a di-
agnostic category are heterogeneous. Furthermore, they vary in their ability to report on 
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their thoughts. Color-naming word lists reflecting varying content of importance to pa-
tients with a specific disorder may help the clinicians determine which issues are most 
central for a particular individual. 
Finally, if self-schemata play an important role in social phobia, then successful treat-
ment should change them, and this change should be reflected on the Stroop. We are cur-
rently examining whether treatment gains are associated with decreased latencies for social 
threat words. 
In conclusion, the information-processing strategies utilized by social phobics and pan-
ickers in this study support Beck’s notion that anxiety-disordered individuals’ self-schemata 
facilitate the processing of cues related to their specific sphere of vulnerability. While much 
remains to be done, this preliminary study and those cited above indicate that the meth-
odologies developed by experimental cognitive psychologists have much to offer clinical 
researchers testing hypotheses derived from cognitive-behavioral theories of anxiety dis-
orders. 
 
Acknowledgments – Portions of this paper were presented at the World Congress of Behaviour Therapy, Edin-
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Note 
1. Degrees of freedom equal 28 because one panicker failed to complete the Shipley Scale. 
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